Been There/ Done That

Friday, March 09, 2007

PhD Planning

Hi there! I'm back, after a long hiatus... I have been busy, settling in at my new apartment, and above all, writing my thesis! I have been mainly concerned with the first, expositive part, and this hasn't given rise to many controversial issues to discuss here, I guess.
Well, it's going pretty well, so far. I thought that it would be a nice idea to post my new planning here, so that everyone can see what I am up to. I will be editing this entry, updating the status of the different chapters as I go along, so that I can review my own progress! This could add some extra motivation! ;)

So, here it is:

Consciousness, Conceivability and Concepts

0. Introduction

Part I: Consciousness, Conceivability Arguments and Physicalism

1. What is physicalism? (final draft)

2. Epistemic arguments against Physicalism I: the Conceivability Argument (final draft)
a. The zombie argument
b. Notions of conceivability
c. Kripkean counterexamples to the conceivability-possibility link
d. The 2-dimensional argument

3. Epistemic arguments against Physicalism II (final draft)
a. Kripke’s modal argument
b. The property dualism argument
c. The knowledge argument

Part II: The Non-exceptionalist strategy

4. Concepts, Conceptual Analysis and Physicalism (final draft)
a. Chalmers & Jackson on concepts, a priori entailment and physicalism
b. A reply to Chalmers & Jackson: a critique of ambitious conceptual analysis

Part III: The Exceptionalist strategy

5. The Phenomenal Concept Strategy (first draft)
a. The phenomenal concept strategy, explained
b. Phenomenal Concepts: The Accounts
(i) The Recognitional Model
(ii) The Quotational Model
(iii) The Indexical Model

6. Problems for the phenomenal concept strategy I (revised draft)
a. Chalmers’ dilemma: phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap
b. Reply: explaining the explanatory gap

7. Problems for the phenomenal concept strategy II (revised draft)
a. Stoljar on the recognitional account
b. Reply: the recognitional account, revisited
c. Stoljar on the conceivability argument against behaviourism
d. Reply: two conceivability arguments distinguished

Part IV: Conclusion

8.Exceptionalism vs. Non-exceptionalism? A defence of a mixed account

So this is it! Sounds like fun? Well... just wait and see!

All comments very welcome!


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